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the court to order the defendant to pay. 1 By means of section 
409.910(1), the State directs its courts to prevent those whom the State 
sues from contesting its claim and from presuming to quarrel over the 
amount. Rather, the court is to treat the claim as having a proper legal 
foundation, and similarly to treat the amount demanded as both due and 
in default. 
The idea of Florida's section 409.910(1), as we shall see in the 
ensuing pages, however, is like a page taken from the Hans Christian 
Andersen fable about the Emperor's New Clothes. Through the verbal 
cellophane of section 409.910(1), a claim merely seeks "full recovery" 
from "a liable party" who has put the State to some expense for which 
it straightforwardly wants now to be reimbursed. So long as all agree 
(i.e., so long as one accepts this description), all is well. To the extent 
one would want more evidence regarding the particular expense (such 
as ''just what expense is it said the defendant put the state to?" or 
"would you mind very much explaining why you so declare?"), even as 
the small child was caused to wonder in Copenhagen despite the curious 
lack of doubt expressed by anyone else, the statute anticipates this 
inquiry-and seeks to cut it off. It simply denies the pertinence of any 
such meddlesome inquiry. How? It does so by directing the courts to 
suspend principles of law and equity inconsistent with the claim of 
liability and of presumed entitlement to the sum the State seeks, so to 
preclude any effective demurrer and any effective defense. We shall see 
shortly just how this is done. 
In the background of this Commentary there are three constitutional 
clauses that are intertwined. The first is the Fifth Amendment provision 
against the taking of private property for public use with no 
compensation (much less "just" compensation) at all. The clause is 
implicated insofar as, despite the cellophane wrapper, this may be what 
Florida seeks to do. The second is the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
provisions that neither shall the State deprive any person of property 
without due process of law, requiring a showing of just cause, an 
adequate reason as for some identifiable default on their part, to warrant 
/d. 
1. Florida Statutes§ 409.910(1) (Supp. 1994) provides in relevant part: 
Principles of common law and equity as to assignment, lien, subrogation, 
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all other affirmative defenses 
normally available to a liable third party, are to be abrogated to the extent 
necessary to ensure full recovery, by Medicaid from third-party resources; such 
principles shall apply to a recipient's right to recovery against any third party, but 
shall not act to reduce the recovery of the agency pursuant to this section. 
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what is sought to be taken from them. The third is likewise in the 
Fourteenth Amendment-that no State shall deny to any person the 
equal protection of the laws. All three are directly implicated in the 
Florida scheme. The third is implicated insofar as persons sued by 
Florida Medicaid are denied the equal protection of the law of Florida 
the legislature has presumed to suspend in respect to Florida Medicaid 
claims. The Due Process and Takings Clauses are implicated insofar as 
the State seeks to levy takings of massive judgments sought to be 
recovered from private parties, regardless of how little they did or failed 
to do contributed to the injuries of anyone whom Florida Medicaid 
insures. I mean to examine these questions by considering a short series 
of cases, to illustrate each of these points. 
I. ]ONES V. ZONE PHARMACEUTICAL CO. AND 
FLORIDA MEDICAID V. ZONE PHARMACEUTICAL CO. 
Dr. Peter Smith was called to the scene where James Jones was 
experiencing acute gastric distress. The explanation of Jones' gastric 
distress turned out to be fairly simple-Jones had taken two tablets of 
Zone Aspirin, a standard, unbuffered aspirin, like any other brand of 
unbuffered aspirin? To be sure, the Zone aspirin box clearly stated that 
it contained unbuffered aspirin (rather than buffered aspirin). Moreover, 
clear print on the box also stated a straightforward caution, namely, that 
"unbuffered aspirin may cause some gastric distress in some persons." 
And from his own prior experience, Jones was well aware that he was 
among those who did tend to get gastric distress from unbuffered 
aspirin. Still, findi-ng buffered aspirin temporarily out of stock at the 
grocery store where he happened to be shopping a little earlier, Jones 
had decided to buy (and then use) Zone unbuffered aspirin, instead of 
waiting or looking elsewhere.3 Anyway, when called to the scene, Dr. 
Smith competently administered effective emergency treatment,4 
successfully relieving Jones' gastric pains. The charge for Dr. Smith's 
service was $85, which Jones promptly paid. From these 
unprepossessing facts, two pathways of litigation were to follow. 
2. The distinction of the Zone brand of aspirin being solely in the oblong shape of Zone 
aspirin pills, plus other mere brand-distinguishing insignia (e.g., color and shape of the box, the 
familiar Zone logo, etc.). 
3. All these facts were developed in the course of discovery following Jones' suit, the 
suit he presumed, against the advice of counsel, to file against Zone, as described infra. 
4. In this instance, a dose of Pepto Bismol. 
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A. Litigation Pathway #1 
James Jones, having paid Dr. Smith his $85 fee,5 at once made 
demand for reimbursement from Zone Pharmaceutical Co. (Zone). Jones 
also requested a sum to compensate him for the physical pain and 
distress he sustained. Later, after receiving no response from Zone, 
Jones filed suit against Zone in state court. He sought damages of 
$5,000.6 His claim against Zone was a claim essentially for "products 
liability"-for production and marketing of a product known to be 
unsafe, because it was likely to cause gastric distress in some users, 
which it did, and for which Jones demanded appropriate compensation.7 
Zone filed its answer, in which it denied liability. Following 
discovery (pursuant to which the previously stated facts were established 
to be true, as fully acknowledged by Jones), Zone moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds of assumption of risk by Jones and that the 
aspirin was not defective. In other words, Jones was aware of his 
susceptibility to unbuffered aspirin and elected to purchase and use 
unbuffered aspirin nonetheless, knowing it would be unbuffered, but 
electing to proceed just as he did.8 The court, after examining the briefs 
5. The reasonableness of the fee is not at issue. Though the only needed treatment was 
a dose of Pepto Bismol, it was Peter Smith's professional skill that informed his competent 
judgment that this, rather than anything else, was all that was required to relieve Jones' distress. 
Moveover, Smith did come to attend to Jones, when requested to do so. Jones has no complaint 
about the amount he was charged by Smith. 
6. In addition to his medical costs ($85), Jones sought compensation for his pain and 
suffering incidental to the gastric distress ($4,915). 
7. Smith did not, in this instance, sue on any claim alleging any negligence by Zone, on 
the other hand, of a different sort. For instance, this is not a case where unbuffered tablets were 
alleged to have been accidentally put in boxes labeled "buffered aspirin"; likewise, it is not a 
case where adulterated materials-e.g., rat feces-allegedly found their way into the product; 
similarly, it is not a case where the label (identifying the aspirin as "unbuffered"), or the cause 
(that "unbuffered aspirin may cause gastric distress to some users"), were allegedly less 
conspicuous than Smith could or did claim were required by due care. (The point of these 
distinctions will be developed in Part III, infra.). 
8. A common sense alternative locution to saying that Jones "assumed the risk" is to say 
the following: Zone did nothing whatever to justify holding Zone responsible for Smith's distress 
in these circumstances. Indeed, given what we know, it is no more appropriate to attribute 
responsibility to Zone for Jones' distress than to do so to Hart, Schaffner, and Marks in the 
following case. 
Suppose Hart, Schaffner, and Marks makes and markets suits for men. Jones buys such a 
suit, knowing it is not a "wrinkle free" suit, but, being in a hurry and preferring it under the 
circumstances to another that would be wrinkle free (a "wrinkle free" suit being (a) slightly 
higher in cost, and (b) also having a slightly different feel from an ordinary suit). Some few days 
later, as Jones is in the process of deciding which suit to wear to work one morning, he is 
listening to the local weather forecast; he hears that "there's a likelihood of scattered showers 
today." But he puts on his new suit he knows will wrinkle if he is caught in the rain (he hopes 
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submitted by both parties, quite agreed with Zone that there was no 
liability as a matter of law under these circumstances. Judgment was 
promptly entered for Zone. 
B. Litigation Pathway #2 
I will now add something to the description of this case, though the 
"something" consists merely of two altogether minor and extraneous 
facts that would seem to be without any significance. First, suppose this 
change: by chance, the physician, Dr. Smith, who attended Jones to 
relieve his medical distress, was a "qualified" Medicaid provider.9 And 
second, that being so, Smith received $85 not from Jones but from 
Florida Medicaid for the treatment Smith provided Jones (Jones 
qualifying for Medicaid, as it happens in this case). Suppose next that 
Florida Medicaid, solely ori the strength of having paid Jones' bill (in 
lieu of Jones paying it himself),10 at once made demand for $85 
"reimbursement" from Zone. Simultaneously, Florida Medicaid files a 
lien on property Zone has in Florida. Soon thereafter; it also filed suit 
against Zone. What claim, if any, does Florida Medicaid have? What 
result and why? 
Depending upon how one is inclined to understand Florida Statutes 
section 409.910(1), though Zone is not (and never was) liable to Jones 
for Smith's bill," it appears that Zone may nonetheless be declared 
he won't be because the forecast was of likelihood, not of certainty-quite akin to Jones' use 
of unbuffered aspirin in the case at hand of "likelihood" but not "certainty" of experiencing 
gastric distress). He also decides to leave both his mincoat and his umbrella at home. 
A light sprinkle falls on his walk to work. He arrives at work altogether rumpled. Some time 
later, he sends a bill to-Hart, Schaffner, and Marks. The bill is for $5.00 (the sum he paid to 
the dry cleaners to have his rumpled suit pressed to remove the wrinkles), plus $800 for 
humiliation and anguish-he was embarrassed all day at work because of his rumpled suit, he 
was made the butt of co-workers comments, and he even was made to worry he might be 
thought to be such a dunce he would lose his job. When Hart, Schaffner, and Marks declines 
to pay, Smith sues on a products liability claim-namely, the suit he bought was "defective" in 
not possessing wrinkle-free properties (altogether parallel to Zone aspirin pills being allegedly 
"defective" in not possessing buffering). Hart, Schaffner, and Marks thinks this is an amazing 
claim by Smith (chutzpa). No doubt it is, and I shall return to this point later on, also in Part 
III. 
9. There is nothing special meant to be implied by this description; it means merely that 
Dr. Smith meets whatever ordinary criteria of eligibility any participating physician meets, such 
that the treatment he or she provides is of a sort qualifying for reimbursement when the 
treatment is furnished to one eligible for Medicaid. 
10. Or, as might happen in some other case (namely, in the case of some person not on 
Medicaid), where the bill went unpaid, Dr. Smith might attempt to recover from Zone for his 
bill (but, of course, he will fail). 
11. According to Florida law itself, Zone is not liable to Jones. See discussion in supra 
Part I.A. 
568 FLORIDA LA IV REV/ElY [Vol. 46 
liable to Florida Medicaid-solely by mere chance of who purchased its 
aspirin. 12 Though nothing has changed, save only that Florida Medicaid 
has presumed to substitute itself for Jones and present itself as 
plaintiff, 13 the defense conclusively valid against Jones 14 is to be 
disregarded insofar as Florida Medicaid would find that defense an 
impediment to collecting $85 from Zone, according to (one reading 
of) 15 the following law: 
12. This merely depends on whether the purchaser happened to be eligible for Medicaid 
rather than ineligible for Medicaid. If this is so, and evidently it is (indeed it is the distinction), 
in my view the Florida statute is unconstitutional pursuant to the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. A law that presumes to measure the liability of another based on such 
a consideration and nothing other than such a consideration, is utterly arbitrary, or so it seems 
to me. For whether one who buys aspirin (or any other product) is, or is not, "Medicaid eligible" 
would seem to have no more relevance in measuring the potential liability, or extent of liability, 
of aspirin producers in Florida than whether one who buys aspirin is or is not taller, or shorter, 
than five feet and five inches in height. Neither characteristic has any more bearing than the 
other as a rational basis for imputing a particular scope of duties or liabilities to a producer 
or of a seller of goods. If either such characteristic does have a more rational basis than the 
other for such a purpose, what will one (the State, for instance) assert it to be? 
Whether one who buys and uses aspirin is taller or shorter than five feet and five inches 
clearly has no rational bearing as a consideration in determining whether, or the extent to which, 
an aspirin producer should or should not be required to pay such medical bills as that person 
may incur, whether as a consequence of buying and consuming aspirin, or whether from falling 
off a bus. Regardless of what one may hold to be the proper basis for holding an aspirin 
producer responsible for the medical bills of another, one would readily concede that it is 
arbitrary to make that liability or responsibility different on any factor such as height. 
Similarly, the "medicaid eligibility" (or lack thereof), as a characteristic of an aspirin 
purchaser, has nothing to say to us by way of determining whose medical bills a producer of 
aspirin should be held accountable to pay. If, in the circumstances, they are somehow (perhaps 
for good reason), thought to be appropriately responsible for the medical bills of one such 
person, the reason that would make it so cannot be said to be less true in respect to the other, 
and vice versa as well (i.e., such reason makes clear that they are not appropriately responsible 
for the medical bills of one such person, being equally present in respect to the other, must be 
sufficient against them as well). In all respects, so far as I can see, there can be no justification 
so to measure the liability, or extent of liability, of producers of aspirin on such a consideration. 
than were it to be made to turn on the mere height of the purchaser instead. The argument here, 
moreover, is not an argument about "equal protection," rather, it is a straightforward 
consideration of simple "due process of law." 
13. It is a substitution asserted solely on the strength of Florida Medicaid having paid 
Jones' bill to Dr. Smith, and not on the basis of claiming any other relation as such with Zone 
or any other producer of aspirin or any other goods. 
14. And a defense likewise conclusively still valid against anyone else who might seek 
to recover whatever they paid Smith on Jones' behalf (here, $85), for likewise none of them 
would have any claim over against Zone in this case (e.g., Jones' brother-in-law who paid the 
bill; Jones' private medical insurer who paid the bill; Jones' employer whose medical plan 
covered Smith's fee; Jones himself, etc.). Accordingly, the due process point remains entirely 
intact. See supra note 12. 
15. We shall consider a different reading in infra Part Ill. 
1994) DENYING DUE PROCESS 
Principles of common law and equity as to assignment, lien, 
subrogation, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, 
and all other affirmative defenses normally available to a 
liable third party, are to be abrogated to the extent 
necessary to ensure full recover/6 by Medicaid from third-
party resources; such principles shall apply to a recipient's 
rightl7 to recovery against any third party, but shall not act 
to reduce the recovery of the agency pursuant to this 
section.18 
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Defenses "normally available"19 shall not be available against the State 
for such sums as the State expends on Jones' medical bills, if and when 
it sues Zone to pay Jones' bill? But why should that be so, and wherein 
is due process of law satisfied? 
All that Florida Medicaid can account for, even to explain its 
presence in court in presuming to sue Zone in the first place, is its 
evidence of having paid Smith for Jones' bill. Unless it has some other 
relation with Zone (which it doesn't)/0 or unless there is some act or 
neglect by Zone for which act or neglect Zone might reasonably be 
deemed to have waived its valid defenses (and no such act or neglect is 
alleged),21 the statutory provision seems on its face to be no better than 
an arbitrary denial of due process of law. "We paid Jones' medical bill 
and, because we did, you must pay us, regardless, "22 is not consistent 
16. "Full recovery" meaning full recovery of such sums as Florida Medicaid may have 
paid out on behalf of the Medicaid-eligible person, however large or small such sums may be 
(e.g., whether $85 or $850,000, or $8.5 million). 
17. This, of course, applies to Jones, and of course it likewise applies to anyone 
attempting to claim through him after paying whatever bilL he incurred to Smith. For examples 
of such other persons, see discussion in supra note 14. And insofar as that is so (and it is so), 
the question that appropriately arises at once is this: why do these principles of law not apply 
equally to Florida M~icaid, as to anyone else (i.e., what is so special as to distinguish them)? 
I suggest that the state has no satisfactory answer to that elementary question. (fry answering 
for them-what would you say?). 
18. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (Supp. 1994) (footnotes supplied). 
19. Note this language well, i.e., "normally available" (meaning "normally available 
according to Florida law"). 
20. Florida Medicaid appears in court with standing to sue Zone, derived exclusively from 
the bare fact of its payment to Dr. Smith of the medical bill incurred by Jones, and absolutely 
nothing else at all. See supra note 13. It claims no other relationship whatever with Zone (and 
there is none) on which it can rely to transfer Jones' bills to Zone. 
21. For, indeed, none appears to be required to be shown by Florida Medicaid under this 
bizarre act, when it is Florida Medicaid that brings the suit, though it would be required to be 
shown under "normal" Florida law, were the suit to have been brought by anyone else other than 
Florida Medicaid itself. 
22. E.g., "regardless of the fact that you may never have been respohsible for the bill, for 
we admit, to be sure, that it was not your bill, but merely Jones' bill: and we admit, too, that 
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with due process of law.23 
It is fair enough that when Florida Medicaid might pay a bill for 
what was in some fair sense, according to Florida law, Zone's 
responsibility, Florida Medicaid might in that instance, unlike this 
instance, recover its payments from Zone.24 That, however, is not the 
case here. Zone has breached no duty it had to Florida, for nothing in 
the marketing of the product offended any Florida law. Rather, Florida 
Medicaid purports to bootstrap itself by legislation that describes Zone 
as a "liable party" forbidden, however, to invoke any valid defense (e.g., 
such as Jones' assumption of the risk) Florida law recognizes, even (as 
here) to such extent as it would show nonliability in fact. By legislative 
fiat, an invalid claim or an invalid portion of a claim held by Jones is 
made a valid claim when Florida Medicaid presents it as its own claim 
to Zone.25 
To the extent that "principles of common law and equity as to 
not only was it Jones' bill, rather than yours, but that Jones could make out no valid claim to 
hold you responsible for the bill, either at the time he incurred it, or, for that matter, even 
now .... " 
23. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
24. The familiar model for thus proceeding would be merely the same as that used by 
various state welfare departments, entitled by statute to proceed against delinquent fathers, to 
sue to recover child support payments which were properly their responsibility (which they 
failed to discharge), for which the department properly seeks reimbursement from them for 
amounts they expended on behalf of their children under AFDC. The case stands in useful 
contrast with this one because this case pretends there is no difference that should matter (when, 
to the contrary, there is a difference that should matter). If this difference does not matter (which 
is precisely the effect of this statute), the question must be asked: "why not?" And, once again, 
the answer must, to satisfy the Constitution, be somewhat better than "were it to matter, Florida 
Medicaid would be unable to proceed to make Zone pay for Jones' bills." (To which the answer 
is, and ought to be, straightforwardly to respond: "Yes, and so, what would be in any way 
strange or odd about that?"). 
25. Is this a case where "water is made to rise higher than its source"? Exactly, for in 
essence that is what the Florida Legislature has attempted to do via this statute. For an 
additionally instructive example, consider also the following case where Florida Medicaid were 
itself a purchaser of Zone aspirin, which it itself then distributes to its employees, or to eligible 
medicaid recipients, neglecting, however, to advise them that the aspirin they are receiving is 
unbuffered aspirin (Florida Medicaid having taken the aspirin from the original boxes and 
distributing them merely as individual tablets). Unwarned employees and recipients suffering 
gastric distress may have a cause of action against Florida Medicaid for its negligence. 
Obviously, however, Florida Medicaid has no cause of action against Zone (such fault as there 
was, was exclusively its own-quite like that of Jones in our original case). Suppose, however, 
one or more of these adversely affected Medicaid recipients has their gastric distress treated by 
a qualified Medicaid provider whom Florida Medicaid reimburses as such (i.e., for authorized 
treatment of an eligible Medicaid person). Having done so, may it tzow proceed to "recover" the 
sums it thus paid from Zone? Under one view of§ 409.910(1), apparently it could. (And why 
should that be so?). 
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assignment" would themselves normally bar a claim of this sort if 
brought by anyone else,26 Florida Medicaid seeks to free itself of that 
bothersome impediment as well. It is seemingly much assisted by the 
new statute which airily directs that all such principles are simply to be 
ignored ("principles of common law and equity as to assignment . . . are 
to be abrogated")27 insofar as they would stand in the way of recovery. 
But why should that be so? For instance, why ought those principles not 
be respected in this case as much as in any other? I do not believe 
Florida has any satisfactory answer?8 If not, however, the act should 
be held invalid under the due process provisions of the Florida 
Constitution29 and the Fourteenth Amendment as well.30 
IT. Bus Co. v. JoNES, JONES v. Bus Co., AND 
FLORIDA MEDICAID V. Bus Co. 
Before venturing an additional (and more careful) review of the case 
we have just examined, however, I think it also may be useful to 
consider the following case. Doing so may enable one to get a clearer 
view of what is fundamentally wrong with the proposed Florida 
provision, a view we may usefully draw on still later on. 
Our first case posed facts involving a defendant (Zone) to whom 
Jones was unable to impute any liability for anything. In this second 
case, that will no longer be true. Jones will be able to impute liability 
for something.31 Otherwise, however, the questions will be the same.32 
26. As, indeed, such "principles" clearly would. See supra note 25. 
27. Note the very irony of the statutory language, that "principles of common law and 
equity as to assignment are to be abrogated," meaning exactly this-"that insofar as there are 
certain principles of common law and of equity as to assignment that would, if merely respected 
here as in any other case, necessarily preclude recovery by Florida Medicaid of the amount it 
seeks from Zone, well, not desiring that result, we hereby direct that such principles are to be 
abrogated and the courts of Florida are directed to ignore them-to disregard mere 
principles-insofar as, were they not disregarded, they too would demonstrate that Florida 
Medicaid has no claim against Zone for such swns as it seeks." 
28. For what is the basis of so demanding that these "principles" be "abrogated" if (but 
only it) Florida Medicaid files suit? What, indeed, if anything, makes it inappropriate for these 
principles to be respected in the Florida courts with the same evenhandedness the Florida courts 
would ordinarily observe? Unless the State can provide a satisfactory answer (an answer better, 
of course, than merely to say that "unless the normal rules are suspended, we'll be unable to 
prevail"), the courts of Florida should not accede to this directive consistent either with its own 
constitutional rulings or the Due Process Clause. 
29. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
30. U.S. CONST. art. XIV,§ I. 
31. The question will become, rather, "how much?" 
32. Namely, the extent (if any) to which a defendant is liable to the only party capable of 
claiming damages in the first instance, and the consequences of the Florida statute when Florida 
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Herein a review, then, of "comparative negligence," which (like 
"assumption of the risk") is described in the Florida statute as "an 
affirmative defense,"33-a defense that although declared valid to the 
extent of its normal applicability to limit the recovery of the person 
whose medical bills Florida Medicaid assumed responsibility to pay, is 
declared to be unavailable when it is not that person, but rather Florida 
Medicaid, that seeks to assign the full cost of those medical bills "to a 
liable party" instead. Here, we shall locate a "liable party," to be sure, 
but the basic question will not be changed at all.34 
Suppose, then, the case of Jones. Jones had been heavily drinking 
and, even so, was riding his motorcycle at 85 mph on a road posted at 
a maximum lawful speed of 35 mph, when he collided with a bus. 
Unsurprisingly under the circumstances, Jones was near-fatally (but not 
quite fatally) injured?5 The bus was hardly scratched. Though the bus 
was "hardly scratched," still the bus company undoubtedly has a cause 
of action against Jones for the damage thus done to its bus.36 We 
stipulate this damage to be $1,000. So, that is the amount the bus 
company seeks from Jones. As it happened, however, there was some 
negligence on the part of the bus driver (as well as the far greater 
negligence-indeed recklessness-of Jones). The negligence of the bus 
driver was in the fact that a few seconds before Jones came into plain 
view, the driver took his eyes from the road to change radio channels, 
even as he was approaching the intersection where Jones was about to 
appear-barreling through the intersection at 85 mph from the driver's 
left. 
The driver's conduct ("negligence") may have been a contributing 
Medicaid, having picked up the medical bills for the injured party, seeks a greater amount than 
that. (Unsurprisingly, our answers will turn out to be the same as those provided by our review 
of the first case.). 
33. Here again is the critical provision of the Florida statute: 
Principles of common law and equity as to assignment, lien, and subrogation, 
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all other affirmative defenses 
normally available to a liable third party, are to be abrogated to the extent 
necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources: such 
principles shall apply to a recipient's right to recovery against any third party, but 
shall not act to reduce the recovery of !he agency pursuant to this section. 
FLA. STAT.§ 409.910(1) (Supp. 1994). 
34. That basic question is, of course, at all times, "liable for what?" 
35. Had he been "fatally" injured, his medical bills would have been much, much less than 
they turned out to be .... 
36. Why? Well, obviously, because the damage sustained by the bus was damage sustained 
as a direct consequence of Jones' reckless and drunken driving. (It is utterly unremarkable that 
the bus company would seek to recover the costs of repairs from Jones.) 
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factor to the horrendous accident that nearly killed Jones (but instead 
left him permanently paralyzed, after months of painful and expensive 
surgery). Whether it was or not, we need not ~ay now. For present 
purposes, it is enough to stipulate that whether it was a contributing 
factor is close enough to be a fair question for the jury. It would be up 
to the jury to decide whether, had the driver not thus been distracted, he 
might not only have had time to see Jones but also have had time and 
opportunity to apply his brakes such that Jones, despite his inebriated 
condition and despite his reckless speed, might have brushed by the bus 
instead of crashing into the left front bumper of the bus, as he did.37 
Oddly, Jones is thus also able to state a prima facie case of his own 
against the bus company:38 duty of reasonable care (owed by defendant 
toward others on the road); breach as a cause in fact (and proximate 
cause?)39 of plaintiffs injury. To be sure, plaintiff was far from being 
without some fault as well (we have already established it to have been 
considerable). Florida, as it happens, however, does not preclude Jones 
from recovering something from the bus company even though that is 
so.40 Florida is in fact a "pure comparative negligence" state. 
Supposing the damage to the bus to be $1,000 and that Jones' 
37. Note: were defendant's evidence clear and utterly convincing that even had the driver 
been fully attentive, the collision could not have been avoided (or diminished), defendant would 
be entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law. 
38. Although in some oiher states (e.g., North Carolina) he would be unable to do at all. 
See infra note 40. 
Here, incidentally, the case we suppose is one brought against the bus company, seeking 
damages for Jones, for injuries caused (or, more accurately, "causally contributed to") "by the 
failure of the bus driver to use due care in the operation of the bus." Alternatively, the case 
would not be different were the "contributing cause" to be traced not to some behavioral lapse 
by the driver, but instead to some defect in the bus itself, for which defect the manufacturer 
were equivalently liable, with Jones bringing his action against them. Such a case would be one 
differing only in the following way: 
The bus driver was never less than fully attentive (he did all that he could have done), and 
neither was the bus company at fault (in its maintenance of the bus, training of the driver, etc.). 
However, close inspection of the bus, following the accident, determined that a warning light 
designed to flash on the dashboard when brake fluid would be needed had failed. The warning 
light failed because the bulb used by the manufacturer was of such marginal quality that it had 
burned out. Because the bulb failed, the driver was without warning that the brakes might not 
stop as effectively, due to the low pressure in the brake lines. The driver, in this scenario, did 
all that he reasonably could do to avert the collision with Jones, as had (by stipulation) the bus 
company. Obviously, however, the manufacturer had not done its part to the extent that it 
should. We shall come back to this version of the case later on. See infra note 58. 
39. It was, more accurately, a "contributing cause" (Jones' conduct assuredly being a 
contributing cause as well). 
40. In North Carolina, in contrast, Jones' "contributory negligence" would cut off any 
recovery in this same case. In some other states, Jones would receive nothing if he was more 
at fault than the other party (i.e., "more than 50% to blame" for the accident). 
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conduct is regarded as a 90% contributing cause of collision (the 
driver's conduct being regarded as a 10% contributing cause), this 
means (or so I am informed by a colleague who teaches torts) that in 
Florida, in the action that might be brought by the bus company against 
Jones41 for damage sustained to its bus from Jones' reckless driving, 
the bus company would receive $900 on its claim (90% of $1,000). And 
reciprocally, in the action brought by Jones against the bus company, 
for damages sustained by Jones, supposing the damages to be $5 
million, and the bus company's conduct a 10% contributing cause 
(Jones' conduct being 90% responsible), Jones would receive $500,000 
on his claim (10% of $5 million).42 Indeed, this figure ($500,000, not 
less and certainly not more) precisely describes Florida's view of the 
bus company's liability to Jones. 
In this scenario, the bus company is regarded by Florida as 
responsible for ten percent of Jones' damages ($500,000),43 and 
assuredly no more. Under Florida's own view, the actionable activities 
of the bus company were deemed to be a contributing cause of Jones' 
injuries exactly to this extent, but also to no greater extent than this.44 
To such extent that Jones sustained greater injuries (as indeed he did), 
in Florida's view, he sustained these greater injuries in no different way 
than had he thrown himself off a bridge and struck defendant's bus on 
the way down (instead of just much more directly striking the state's 
own road). In such a case, however, I imagine that all would agree45 
that it would be a denial of substantive due process if Florida, after 
picking up a $5 million ·medical bill to supply lifetime assistance to 
Jones, were to presume to sue the bus company for $5 million 
"reimbursement" for such care as it elected to provide Jones.46 
Straightforwardly, however, the case we have examined is 
foundationally no different from this case, once we walk through it 
again with care. It helps to explain just why the company is liable for 
no more than ten percent of Jones' injury-and is not liable41 for any 
41. See supra notes 36, 38 for a statement of the bus company's case. 
42. Jones thus "nets" $499,100 from the crash ($500,000 minus $900). 
43. From which it is entitled to offset $900 (of the $1000) of its damages for which, by 
the same law, Jones was responsible to it. 
44. Sorry to say this more than once, but the point is so important (and dispositive) I think 
it can scarcely be repeated often enough. 
45. Florida included. 
46. "Sue them for what?" one would be inclined to ask (i.e., "sue them for damages 
because their bus happened to be moving along the road at the time Jones decided to jump from 
the bridge and smashed himself on the bus rather than on the pavement, or on some passing 
private automobile instead?"). 
47. And cannot be "deemed" liable. 
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more than that. The scope of the bus company's fair responsibility to 
Jones is measured by the extent to which Florida law regards the bus 
company's conduct (i.e., the driver's conduct in this instance) to have 
been a contributing cause of Jones' injuries. For just that measure of 
responsibility, the bus company is fully liable, and, so too, it is also not 
liable for anything more.48 
Nothing in this assessment is changed, moreover, whether Florida 
Medicaid is willing (or, indeed, even obliged) by state law to defray 
such medical expenses as Jones may be unable to sustain on his own, 
or whether Florida Medicaid is not involved at all.49 Whether Florida 
Medicaid picks up or does not pick up the portion of Jones' injuries for 
which Jones himself was solely responsible has nothing to say to us, for 
there is no reason that that datum can rationally have any effect at all 
so to enlarge the responsibility of the bus company post hoc. If, indeed, 
as the State itself conceded (as it must-by force of its own substantive 
law of torts) that the bus company bore responsibility for but 10% of 
Jones~ injury (Jones himself bearing full responsibility for the rest-as 
much as though he had thrown himself from a bridge), it at once 
concedes likewise the arbitrariness of pretending that, somehow, the 
company's responsibility suddenly became greater than it was, post hoc. 
Nothing in this understanding is altered, moreover, by the.stratagem 
enacted by the Florida Legislature in the manner attempted in section 
409.910(1). To the contrary. The arbitrariness of the statute itself is 
merely italicized insofar as the act itself acknowledges that the bus 
company of course has an "affirmative defense," one acknowiedged as 
"normally available," but at once declared not to be available here. The 
unanswerable question remains: why isn't it available (i.e., why doesn't 
it deny due process of law to so declare it "unavailable"), when there is 
no more reason to impute to the bus company in this case anything 
more as within its responsibilities to answer for the extent to which its 
conduct was a contributing cause to the injuries Jones received, than 
when Jones' injuries happen not to be eligible for Medicaid assistance? 
I know of no satisfactory response the State can provide.50 
The "normal defense" we have properly identified is merely the 
"defense" that all persons in Florida are liable to such extent (and not 
48. On Florida's own view of the matter, for the balance of the injuries Jones sustained, 
the bus company is no more appropriately responsible, than in the case where Jones threw 
himself off the bridge, doing himself terrible damage upon the bus (terrible damage he would 
have sustained equally by hitting the road). To hold the bus company responsible, however, 
would be utterly arbitrary, as Florida (according.to its own law) would entirely agree. 
49. E.g., as would be the case where Jones' insurance covered the whole $5 million (or 
as would be the case were there simply no Florida Medicaid at all). 
50. Indeed, one should be eager to hear what Florida will have to say. 
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beyond such extent) as their conduct can fairly be said to have 
contributed to the injury of another.51 And we already know, according 
to Florida law, to what extent that can be said in respect to the bus 
company in this case (namely, 10%-Jones' conduct furnishing 90%)52 
such that if the whole damage to Jones is $5 million, then the 
company's share is $500,000, and cannot fairly said to be any more. In 
the bridge case, the contributing conduct of the bus company was zero 
(the conduct by Jones himself was 100%). In this case, as we have 
already determined, according to the very manner a Florida court would 
adjudge the case by its own law of comparative negligence, the 
negligent conduct of the driver was a 10% contributing cause to Jones' 
injuries (Jones' conduct-recklessness verging on virtual suicide-was 
a 90% contributing cause, and not a bit less than that). 
Taking this as a given, whether Florida itself thereafter provides 
some assistance, no assistance, or complete assistance to Jones, the mere 
datum can have no effect on the responsibility of the bus company, 
either to Jones or to Florida (any more than Florida could presume to 
hold the bus company "responsible" for any part of such assistance 
it-through Florida Medicaid-may provide to Jones who, in throwing 
himself off the bridge, happened to fall on the bus). The due process 
analysis remains intact, whether we have a case where the legally 
answerable conduct of the bus company was "a 0% contributing cause" 
(Jones' conduct being a 100% contributing cause), "a 1% contributing 
cause" (Jones' conduct being a 99% contributing cause of his own 
injuries), a 27%, an 87%,53 or even a 99% (but even so, not a 100%) 
51. It is really less a "defense" than a simple failure by plaintiff to show any adequate 
basis for seeking to have the bus company pay all the medical expenses he incurred. I add this 
note simply to emphasize how much in fact this case has in common with our original case-the 
case of Jones and Zone aspirin. See supra Part I. 
52. As in the bridge case where Jones furnished 100%, all would agree, accordingly, that 
the bus company, being entirely unresponsible (not "irresponsible" but unresponsible) for Jones' 
injury could not be held liable at all. 
53. What might be a suitable "87%" example? Perhaps this-that Jones is injured in a 
collision with a bus, the extent of injury to his head, however, would have been substantially 
less had he worn a helmet he preferred to leave at home, despite the state's mandatory 
motorcycle helmet law. (The case in this respect is not a whit different from Jones in our 
original case, who elected to buy unbuffered good aspirin.) In his successful suit against the bus 
company, 13% of his overall injuries are deemed to be due to his own conduct (and not that of 
the bus company), exactly in keeping with Florida's "comparative negligence" rule, as we have 
seen it applied. And, again, insofar as this is exactly what Florida itself regards as proper in 
order that the bus company not be held liable beyond its responsible share of Jones' injuries, 
nothing in the happenstance of how (or by whom) the difference is made up should appropriately 
affect it ex post (e.g., that in the particular case that it may have been made up by funds 
supplied by Florida Medicaid rather than, say, by Jones' uncle, his friends, or indeed by his own 
commercial insurer). The bus company's responsibility does not magically become different ex 
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contributing cause. 
ill. A STATUTORY CODA-A CLOSER LOOK AT THE 
FLORIDA LA W:54 FLORIDA MEDICAID V. ZONE 
PHARMACEUTICAL CO. (II) 
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I now want to go back to the original case, to pick up on a point that 
could possibly have vexed the sharpest of lawyers as they were 
following the manner in which that case was treated in our review of the 
Florida law. The Florida statute, one may well have noted even when 
we first looked at it, spoke (and of course still speaks) only of the 
legislative abrogation of "comparative negligence, assumption of the 
risk, and all other affirmative defenses" otherwise available "to a liable 
third party."55 We took the statute at face value as applying to the case 
we examined. We did so, quite understandably making little of the 
reference to "a liable third party," perhaps simply because the statute 
would make no coherent sense if it spoke of abrogating "affirmative 
defenses" of "nonliable third parties" (for virtually by status of who they 
are, nonliable third parties have no need of "affirmative defenses" at 
all).s6 
Still, because of what might have troubled a good lawyer in our 
treatment of the original case,57 it may be useful to come back to that 
case and examine it in light of these words in the Florida statute. Why? 
Because, according to its own terms, as we have just noted again, the 
statute applies only when the third party was a liable party in at least 
some minimal and meaningful sense. 
post. And again, if it is to be made greater ex post, then the question must be answered-why, 
and why when Florida Medicaid, but no one else, preswnes so to assert? I know of no 
satisfactory answer Florida can supply. 
54. As suggested by Professor James Boyle. 
55. Here, once again, for ease of reference, is the key section (note the italicized word): 
Principles of common Jaw and equity as to assignment, lien, subrogation, 
comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all other affirmative defenses 
normally available to a liable third party, are to be abrogated to the extent 
necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources; such 
principles shall apply to a recipient's right to recovery against any third party, but 
shall not act to reduce the recovery of the agency pursuant to this section. 
FLA. STAT.§ 409.910(1) {Supp. 1994) {emp~asis added). 
56. It would be a virtual oxymoron to speak of a "nonliable third party's affirmative 
defenses." 
57. Not the second case-the bus case-but merely the original case (Jones v. Zone 
Phannaceutical Co. and Florida Medicaid v. Zone Phannaceutical Co.). 
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On this reading, however, the statute is not applicable (indeed, is 
never applicable) to enable Florida Medicaid to make demand on a third 
party, when this third party never had any liability to begin with. In 
brief, the statute assumes-and by its own terms only operates when 
that assumption is sound-that there was some liability in the original 
case, even if it was quite limited or quite small, or may not have 
amounted to much, or, finally, might even have been extinguished 
altogether by force of the defendant's "affirmative defense." Indeed, the 
case we were originally considering was one that might have seemed to 
have been just this last sort-potential liability to Jones, successfully 
parried by "affirmative defense" of "assumption of risk." In fact, we 
deliberately described the original case in this fashion just to make it 
seem clearer exactly how the Florida statute would apply in respect to 
any such affirmative defense. 
But proceeding in this way may have been gratuitous. Or, rather, one 
may put the matter more emphatically: proceeding in this way may have 
been premature, just plain wrong. The case, as I described it, assumed 
that Zone was "a liable third party," subject to avoiding that liability 
only on the strength of some "affirmative defense." But was Zone a 
"liable party" able to defeat Jones' claim under Florida law by the 
affirmative defense of "assumption of risk"? Or may it more accurately 
be said that Jones failed because he was unable to show any legal basis 
for bringing suit against Zone-a law making Zone a "liable" party (at 
least provisionally) in some way? If we go back over the original case 
carefully, the answer may surprise us. And insofar as it does, it also 
may affect the result when Florida Medicaid sues-and finds the statute 
to be wholly inapplicable to the particular case. 
One way of trying to answer that critical first question is to try to 
cast Jones' complaint against Zone somewhat more specifically than in 
the vague general terms of a "product liability" case. On what theory 
was Jones advancing that claim? As a complaint based on an aspirin 
producer's strict liability for manufacturing a defective product such that 
Zone is thus liable for Jones' gastric distress insofar as the product was 
defective? A "nice try," we might suggest, but almost certainly not 
applicable here if (as is the case) under Florida law, in respect to aspirin 
clearly identified as "unbuffered" aspirin, the product is in fact not 
defective because it was reasonably fit for its intended purposes and 
contained an adequate warning. 
Jones might have had a different legal theory (indeed, he would need 
to have had one), perhaps one alleging liability traceable to a "design 
defect" in Zone aspirin. But, if so, what is that alleged defect in 
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design?58 One such theory would be this: that by spending just a little 
bit more money, Zone could in fact have made all its aspirin equally 
safe for all users, so, in respect to all "substandard" aspirin Zone 
presumed to produce and market, it is liable to those who sustain injury 
from its "wrongful" act.59 If the theory is sound, then to be sure Zone 
may be liable (liable for putting a "defective" product on the market) 
and liable to Jones who suffered pain and distress from ingesting that 
"defective" product. 
But the difficulty is the same as we already encountered 
previously-namely, that Florida law may nowhere take this view.60 
That is, unless by statute or by common law, Florida regards the 
marketing of any unbuffered aspirin as per se the marketing of a 
"defectively designed" product, Jones cannot proceed on a claim of this 
sort at all. This is not a matter of an "affirmative defense." Rather, it is 
a matter of a failure to state a cognizable claim. 
A much more plausible view of what Florida might deem to be a 
defective product insofar as Zone (and many other companies) market 
unbuffered aspirin in Florida might not run to the "design" of the aspirin 
as such (there being no defect), but to the "design" of the container 
(thus a "defect of package design") resulting from the absence of an 
adequate warning. And in some circumstance, this would be a 
cognizable claim. On a very standard view, if, virtually without any 
58. Compare supra note 38, our footnote variation on the bus case, where it was the failed 
tiny light bulb (in the brake warning light) that we considered, and where failure of the 
manufacturer to have taken due care to stipulate use of longer-life bulbs in its warning lights 
could well be a properly alleged "defect" in "design." 
59. The "wrongful" act in this case being the "wrongful" act in presuming to produce 
aspirin without buffering (such aspirin being defined as "defective in design" by being 
unbuffered rather than buffered). Consider the case of a tobacco products manufacturer who, 
though having the means (albeit at some slight added cost per cigarette) of insuring that no 
cigarette it offers for sale contains nicotine, fails to take that step. The "defective products" 
claim in such a case would run something like this. The "defect" is not in the production of the 
cigarette (it was well produced). The "defect" is not in the labeling (we may suppose the label 
discloses the presence of nicotine); the "defect" isn't even in the absence of a suitable caution 
(e.g., "nicotine may induce dependence"). In the case we suppose here, it is, rather, simply in 
the fact that the "product" could have been made safer (by removing the nicotine), while still 
functioning well in ways that make it of positive value to consumer, but was not made safer in 
this way. It is the manufacturer's failure to take care in this respect, when doing so would not 
have imposed an undue expense, but would have significantly reduced "tobacco dependency," 
that constitutes a "defectively designed product" in this view. (But query whether Florida law 
takes this view.) . 
60. Which is not to say that Florida law could not take this position if, say, by legislation 
it opted to do so (i.e., there would be no constitutional problem were Florida to take this 
position). Rather, it is only to say that, currently, it has not. (And accordingly, Jones has no case 
to bring against Zone based on a theory of this sort.) 
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added expense to itself, every aspirin producer could furnish a clear 
indication whether a given container holds unbuffered (rather than 
buffered aspirin), insofar as it neglects to so design its retail packages, 
without any indication of what kind of aspirin the particular package 
contains (namely, unbuffered rather than buffered aspirin), its mere 
omission to so mark its packages in this more suitable way might very 
well render the product defective due to inadequate warning. But 
assuming it to be so, in our case, Jones still had no case that can get off 
the ground-because in our case, all Zone aspirin containers were 
properly labeled in just this way. As quickly as that fact is admitted or 
established, Jones' case collapses once again. 
And, carrying this process still one step further, it is plausible that 
Florida law might regard the product as "defective in design" if, despite 
clear labeling of the aspirin container (as containing unbuffered aspirin 
rather than buffered aspirin), it failed to go further, for example, also to 
say why ingesting "unbuffered" aspirin might matter,61 and to say so, 
clearly, on the box. But, assuming that there is such a rule of law in 
Florida's substantive tort law, that very requirement was also no less 
perfectly fulfilled by Zone than were all of its other obligations 
(remember, the label clearly said that "unbuffered aspirin may cause 
gastric distress to some users"). So, again, Jones is unable to state a case 
on that kind of claim as well. 
In fact, to cut through this effort to nail down Jones' theory of Zone 
liability a bit more swiftly, one may comb through the various relevant 
sections of the Restatement of Torts (Second) (and those also of the 
most recent A.L.I. drafts of the Restatement (Third)), and still find 
nothing sufficient to provide Jones with any encouragement to support 
his hope to make some sort of "products liability" claim in this case, 
just as a competent attorney would have so advised him when he first 
came to that attorney's office. There was, from this point of view, in 
brief, never a valid claim statable against Zone by Jones.62 And if this 
61. This would be akin to a requirement to list not only the various substances cigarettes 
contain on the box, but also to list why it may matter to alert buyers of such risks they take 
from the inhalation of these substances. 
62. I.e., Jones was unable to state any kind of "duty of care" cognizable under Florida law 
as a duty that Zone owed to Jones, and wlziclz duly Zone in some way failed lo observe. This is 
just what distinguishes this case from the bus case, where there was such a duty, and admittedly, 
that duty-such as it was-was breached. In contrast, here all such "duties of care" as defined 
by Florida Jaw (as duties owed by Zone to Jones), were at all times faithfully performed by 
Zone. Looked at this way, Zone wasn't a provisionally "liable party" who, though provisionally 
liable, was then somehow able to block it out by pointing to some disqualifying behavior by 
Jones (by way of "affirmative defense"). Zone was never even "provisionally" liable as such. 
Whether, or to what extent, tobacco product claims will fit within this approach (and 
accordingly be dismissable), I cannot say (it will depend upon Florida caselaw; your own 
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is true, such that Zone was never a "liable" party, the statute itself does 
not allow Florida Medicaid to get into court at all. Arguably, there are 
a number of "tobacco cases" where that will equally be true, to cut 
Florida Medicaid off at this first step. 
Personally, I would just as soon prefer the statute not be parsed the 
way I have just struggled to do so in this Coda. I think the due process 
argument is more convincing if the two cases (the aspirin case and the 
bus case) are treated alike in the Florida courts (though I also think the 
due process objection is still entirely sound as developed in the bus case 
by itself). Even so, the exercise in this statutory coda is extremely 
useful, and quite possibly useful in three distinct ways. 
First, it points up something extremely interesting about the idea of 
"assumption of the risk" as such (the "defense" on which Zone 
originally succeeded in having judgment entered in its favor in the 
original case brought against it by Jones). It does so because, under the 
more careful review of Jones' original claim we just completed, it has 
become evident that how the law allocates risks in the first instance is 
itself more subtle than one might have supposed. In the case I just 
presented, for example, what "the law" says is that "Zone did not fail 
in respect to the duties it owed." In other words, there was no breach of 
any duty (of product design, craftsmanship, package design, etc.) and 
Zone was never a "liable third party" at all. But of course, implicit in 
that substantive law is also the understanding that Jones is free (i.e., not 
liable criminally and not liable civilly) to buy and use unbuffered aspirin 
if he wishes, though under the circumstances in the case I presented, he 
is "on his own" insofar as he does. A perfectly natural way of capturing 
the thought is to think of Jones as a person whom the law respects as 
free to assume certain risks as he may choose, it being understood that 
this is part of his freedom for which he may not seek to transfer to 
someone else the costs incidental to his distress (there being no "liable" 
party for him to sue).63 
Second, the point is interesting because it likewise points to a 
research is vastly more capable of discovering the answer better than anything I could try to turn 
up). But the research should assuredly be pursued, for though it may shock the Florida Governor 
himself, it is quite arguable that many of the supposed (tobacco) cases are not subject to this law 
(because there never was a "liable" party at step one). It may be, of course, that the Florida 
Legislature has assumed that there is such liability, such that nearly everything successfully 
invocable to defeat that liability could only be seen by way of "affirmative defense." But, as my 
colleague James Boyle suggested, the fact that the legislature may have assumed a great deal 
of this sort by no means necessarily makes it so (and, in some measure, I agree with_Boyle they 
may well be wrong-at least the subject is worth exploring). 
· 63. And this, of course, was the point in supra note 8, of the case involving Hart, 
Schaffner, and Marks (the case of the wrinkled suit). 
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subtlety in the Florida statute itself, because it indicates how the statute 
must be parsed according to its own terms when it speaks of 
"assumption of the risk" as being "an affirmative defense." There may 
be (and doubtless are) cases in which there would be liability by the 
other party, i.e., cases in which the plaintiff can state a prima facie case 
of liability where the defendant then throws up a shield-a 
defense--conceding the case of prima facie liability, but invoking 
plaintiffs "assumption of the risk" to ward off the usual consequence 
of that prima facie lability-the consequence of being responsible for 
plaintiffs losses.64 But as we have seen, there also are many cases (our 
Zone case was one of them) where risk allocations break out differently 
ab initio-that after scouting the range of "duties" owed by one party 
to another, and after examining the facts, one concludes that no duty 
framed by the relevant law applicable to the circumstances was 
breached, so there never was a "liable" party to begin with.65 
Third, the point is also useful in the way our earlier review sought 
to show; namely, the utter arbitrariness of the Florida statute in terms of 
how it thus would work. In the case where defendant has "zero" liability 
to begin with, whether Florida Medicaid spend $10, $10,000, or 
$10,000,000 to reimburse medical support costs for some stricken, 
eligible person, it concededly has no right to proceed to try to take 
assets from some nonliable person or company. But it says, somehow, 
that it is not arbitrary to take all such assets up to whatever amount that 
might have thus been incurred by it for such services, when defendant 
had anything larger than zero liability instead (e.g., partial liability 
instead). The taking excessive to the defendant's original liability,66 
however, is analytically utterly indistinguishable in its arbitrariness for 
all such excess the State would thus attempt to claim. 
64. Perhaps an example would be one where one signs a contract, after full disclosure of 
risks associated with skiing (or, in Florida, water skiing), and where, but for the contract, the 
ski resort would be liable for injuries the skier sustained on the downhill slope-but where, after 
examining the contract, the fullness of the disclosure of all risks, the adult competence of the 
signing party, etc., the contract is deemed by the court to be valid and applicable to the 
particular claim the plaintiff tried to assert. Here, the contract being valid and applicable, it 
operates straightforwardly as an "affirmative" defense, for conceptually, absent the contract, 
defendant would have been liable to plaintiff in tort. 
65. And, again, therefore, no one for Florida Medicaid itself to sue. 
66. As we worked through in the bus case, the motorcyclist, the comparative bridge-
jumper case, etc. See the Appendix chart of the recovery matrixes, for an illustration of the 
phenomenon as I described it in the cases involving Jones and the Bus Company. 
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N. THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM REDESCRIBED AS A 
DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECI'ION OF THE LAW 
583 
The Florida statute is also subject to objection on the independent 
ground that it denies equal protection of the law. In the end, I continue 
to think the basic substantive due process argument is analytically 
superior. Nevertheless, I have an able colleague who feels somewhat 
uncomfortable with the analysis provided in terms of substantive due 
process. So, here, we shall identify that discomfort, and offer an 
alternative analysis (one of "equal protection") that still comes to the 
same end-that the Florida statute is invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
One reason for this discomfort in using the Due Process Clause 
might be based on an observation that the state legislature, were it so 
inclined, could constitutionally change the substance of the tort law of 
Florida such that whatever features of a plaintiffs own behavior as may 
previously have been deemed sufficient to make the plaintiff himself 
responsible for some (or even all) of the injuries he sustained, need no 
longer be treated by the state as having that effect. An easy example 
would be a change in its law respecting "assumption of the risk." 
Nothing in the Constitution requires the use of this idea (i.e., the idea 
that "no defendant shall be held liable for any risk any plaintiff ought 
reasonably to have been aware of and also had ample opportunity to 
avoid"). A state may be free to take a somewhat different view, whether 
or not others think it wise: it may impose expenses on defendants for 
injuries sustained by others, even if they were sustained by one who, 
perhaps in another state, would be regarded as an "unreasonable" risk-
taker, such that the injuries they sustain are their own responsibility and 
not another's. In brief, no one has a "substantive due process" right in 
the mere common law doctrine of "assumption of the risk" such as it 
may be (or may have been). Therefore, when the state merely declines 
to permit it (that doctrine) to be used in a particular kind of case, e.g., 
to defeat an injured party's claim, it does no constitutional wrong. 
But if that is so, then the idea is that the "greater" power to reduce 
or eliminate the notion of assumption of the risk (i.e., the prerogative of 
a state legislature to do away with assumption of the risk as a basis for 
denying plaintiffs recoveries they could receive if they were no longer 
made to assume certain risks associated with their conduct), must 
include a "lesser'' power (i.e., to do away with it selectively)-which 
one would then try to say is merely what Florida has done. And that if 
this is so, then some believe it also answers our challenge as we have 
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thus far tried to present it.67 But, in one view at least, it does not 
succeed in the same way if, instead, the objection to the way the state 
has presumed to structure its law is recast in terms of "equal protection" 
of the law. I think in fact this is a weaker and less promising approach. 
But I have no objection to looking at the problem in this way. Briefly, 
here is how the "equal protection" analysis works. 
Viewed as an equal protection case, the case we suppose is a case 
involving a statute (or a common law rule) that says something like this: 
"generally, in this jurisdiction, a person is protected from answering in 
damages for such injuries as were sustained by another person, which 
injuries would not have occurred but for a want of ordinary prudence on 
that person's own part."68 So, in respect to "comparative negligence," 
for example, one can see quite readily how this protective law shields 
those sued by others. 
A very good example of such a rule, we might say, is provided by 
the case of the person incurring particular head injuries he would not 
have incurred but for the failure to show ordinary prudence in using a 
helmet when traveling by motorcycle on the public roads. Notice the 
useful features of this case, whether it be described as one of 
"comparative negligence," or whether it be described as "assumption of 
(one kind ot) risk." 
Our case is one in which it is conceded that it is not the cyclist's 
fault that there was a collision (rather, the collision resulted from the 
defendant's oversight, say, for switching lanes without looking to see 
that the cyclist was virtually alongside when the defendant motorist 
moved into the adjoining lane). Still, under our law (as here we stipulate 
it to be), though the cyclist may recover significant damages, including 
nearly all (but not quite all) of his medical expenses, we also say "he 
may not include any for the injuries he would not have sustained but for 
his want of ordinary prudence (indeed, his wrongful act under the 
vehicle code) in riding helmetless." As to that modicum of damages, we 
do not see them as properly chargeable to the motorist, but chargeable 
to the rider instead. And there is surely nothing inappropriate in that 
law, as we see it, whether others choose to copy it or not. 
One may fairly characterize this law as one quite suitably providing 
an example of this state's law respecting "assumption of risk" or 
67. I think this is in fact not true (Florida has not in fact altered the "rules of engagement" 
on assumption of the risk or on comparative negligence; rather, it has attempted to exempt itself 
from the rules). 
68. There are exceptions, but such exceptions arc simply reserved for instances where 
there is some special duty (i.e., responsibility) for the other person, e.g., a parent's support 
obligations toward his or her child (to pay necessary medical expenses incurred by the child). 
or an insurer's obligations. 
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"comparative negligence." It is a law that protects others in respect to 
potential claims by motorcyclists in a specific way-it protects them 
from having to answer for injuries which, in the state's own vieW,69 are 
injuries they ought not have to answer to under the circumstances that 
characterize this case. 
To get to the equal protection question, what we now ask is this: "Is 
there any case in which one may be denied the equal protection of this 
law?"70 To find out, we merely need plod through the following 
review: in which of the cases, if any, is one denied the protection of the 
law we stipulated to be the law of this state? 
a) When one is asked by the motorcyclist to accept the cost of such 
medical expense he incurred and paid in respect to head injuries he 
would not have sustained had he worn his helmet? 
-No, certainly one is not denied its protection in this case.71 Well, 
then, if not denied its protection in this case, what. about the following 
case-
b) When one is instead asked by the motorcyclist's physician to pay 
his bill for having treated those particular injuries? 
-No, the defending driver is equally protected here as well-from 
any such claim any such physician might presume to assert. 
Hmmmm, we say, okay, so the defending driver is equally protected 
in this case as in the original case. But what about the following 
case-is the driver still protected in this case, too? 
c) When one is instead asked by the motorcyclist's insurer to 
reimburse the motorcyclist's insurer for such sums as it paid the 
physician for treating those particular injuries? 
- No, of course not,12 the driver is no more liable to the 
69. Note, we do not say that the State must have a law of this kind, i.e., that something 
in the Constitution or in the Fourteenth Amendment would be violated were it not to have this 
particular law. We merely observe that this is the law of the state and that all motorists receive 
its protection. 
70. If there is not, all is well. If there is, we want to know why, i.e., "why is one denied 
the protection of this law in such case(s)-w/zat suitably distinguishes them so to call for a 
different rule-what sets those cases apart, in some nonarbitrary way?" What makes them 
different, so to hold a defendant liable in a different manner, or to a different extent than 
otherwise? If the state has no satisfactory answer in terms of some identifiable common 
characteristic of these "set aside" cases, it may not be able to proceed to take a defendant's 
assets in the (excessive) manner it proposes. 
71. I.e., the defendant is not unprotected by the law in this instance (rather, to the 
contrary, this is the typical case in which he-the defendant-is protected by this very law). 
72. Were the insurer to be able to collect from the driver, it would obviously defeat the 
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motorcyclist's insurer than to his doctor.73 
Well, then, so far, so good. It's beginning to look fairly solid. There 
are no breaks in the law that refuses to hold the other driver liable for 
those injuries. The State itself says that "these are not injuries 
attributable to defendant's errors in driving such as they might have 
been, but injuries attributable to an act or omission on the part of the 
cyclist." But, well, how about this case: 
d) When asked by the motorcyclist's brother who paid the cyclist's 
doctor's bills for those injuries? 
- No, of course not again.74 And let's get on with this before 
sundown! So let's just quickly address summarily all other cases-all 
cases. 
e) through "n" ("n" being all other cases when still other parties, 
whoever they are, want reimbursement for having paid the bill, and who 
then similarly ask the motorist to pay them). 
-No, no, no, no and N0! 15 
"n+ 1 ") When asked by Florida Medicaid to reimburse them for 
paying the cyclist's bill to the physician who treated him? 
-"Yes." 
"Yes?" "Did you say 'yes'?" But on what basis? More specifically, 
what "new facts" can the State point to (if any), that suddenly make it 
reasonable to hold the motorist for something more in this case than in 
those we have just now reviewed?76 What has the motorist done (or 
failed to do), for example, such that he should now be made to pay for 
the cyclist's negligence, as well as his own, when the State itself 
concedes (see all the above cases) it would not presume to having him 
treated that way under its laws and in its own courts? Or, in short, 
"Why is he denied the equal protection of the law?" 
Certainly it cannot be enough to say (the argument would continue), 
purpose of the law-by transferring to the driver the costs we have already said are attributable 
not to the driver's negligence (such as it was) but attributable, rather, to the remissness of the 
cyclist (whose remissness was his own and in no respect subject to the driver's power to 
influence or to control). 
73. Again, the defendant is protected from any such claim by the very same law. 
74. I.e., here, too, the defendant is equally protected by the very same law. 
75. I.e., here, too, the defendant is equally protected by the very same law. 
76. Florida Medicaid is merely the cyclist's own default insurer, i.e., responsible for 
covering such medical expenses he is without means to pay. 
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for example, "well, eh-the motorist was at least involved in an 
encounter with the cyclist, while others were not, and, also, he was at 
fault. ... " But this response will not do. For, so far as that is true, all 
that at most can appropriately mean is, that, "yes, so he was thus 
'involved,' and therefore he is appropriately chargeable with such bills 
as reflect his full share of those bills, 'fault' and all, such as it was-not 
by the harm the cyclist endured due to no dereliction of the motorist,77 
but strictly according to the dereliction of the motorist, rather than 
matched to include the negligence of the cyclist as well." Florida 
Medicaid may seek such recovery as is appropriate according to that 
standard. Lacking any basis whatever for suddenly "deeming" the 
motorist's accountability to be a larger one than that,78 however, it may 
not seek recovery for anything more. Florida Medicaid's desire to take 
the defendant's property to "reimburse" itself for such support the law 
of the state may oblige it t~ furnish by way of services to the cyclist is 
not a distinction according to which it may seek to transfer its insurer's 
obligations to the motorist-so to require the motorist to pay for the 
cyclist's negligence as well as for his own. It is, rather, to deny the 
equal protection of the law whenever it names itself as plaintiff in mere 
statutory masquerade.79 
77. But due, rather, from his own dereliction as viewed by Florida law (riding without a 
helmet, a matter not within the control of others, and the associated risks of which are not to 
be imputed to them as though it were an incident of their own road-use rather than his neglect). 
78. That "unless the motorist is also to be deemed responsible for the cyclist's additional 
injuries, we will be unable to recover our own expenses as the cyclist's ultimate insurer for 
treatment of injuries incurred as a consequence of his own risky conduct," merely emphasizes 
the obvious. Florida Medicaid really just wants to deny its responsibility as ultimate insurer of 
the cyclist's medical bills he may be unable to pay for lack of suitable savings or means, and 
instead to have them imputed to someone else. 
79. I suggested earlier that I think there may be a weakness in framing the constitutional 
argument in equal protection terms (rather than in terms of due process and appropriations of 
private property for public use-"public use" by Florida Medicaid in providing one kind of 
welfare assistance to those unable to meet their own medical bills). The weakness (such as it 
is-and it is not necessarily serious) is this, namely, that one alleging a denial of equal 
protection standardly compares how he does not differ from others not similarly regulated, i.e., 
that the State is treating him less well than it treats others indistinguishable from himself. Here, 
however, ironically, all are treated in exactly the same way (all are equally denied the protection 
of the law of Florida regarding comparative negligence when Florida Medicaid presumes to sue 
them in cases of the kind we have just reviewed; there are no exceptions to the claim made by 
the State, namely, a claim that if one is a "liable party" at all, one's assets can be taken by the 
State for all that it seeks for such bills as it may have made good on behalf of the party whose 

































Jones and bus collide in Florida, a state with both comparative negligence and a "full recovery" stat-
ute. Assume Jones's medical costs are $1 million, fully paid by Medicaid. Jones also had $X in other 
damages. Assume $1,000 damage.to the bus. Tables show plaintiff's recovery. 
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